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ISLAMIC HEADSCARVES AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION:  
UNVEILING THE THREAT POSED BY ISLAM  
TO HUMAN RIGHTS1
 
MYRA WILLIAMSON 2
 
“Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error…” 
English translation of The Holy Qur’an, surah Al Baqarah (The Cow), verse 256. 3
 
“But every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered dishonoureth her head: for that is even 
all one as if she were shaven. [6] For if the woman be not covered, let her also be shorn: but if it be a shame for a 
woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be covered…[14] Doth not even nature itself teach you, that,…if a woman 
has long hair it is a glory to her?” 
The Bible, Corinthians 1, Chapter 11, verses 5, 6 and 14.4
 
ABSTRACT: This paper is, in part, a response to the NZPGLeJ Editor-in-Chief Herman Salton’s 
article, “‘Veiled Threats?’ Islam, Headscarves and Freedom of Religion in France and the United 
States”, which was published in the first issue of this journal.   However, it moves beyond Salton’s 
article as it seeks to address familiar assumptions regarding the inherent incompatibility of Islam with 
human rights, particularly women’s rights.  By focusing on two distinct issues, the Islamic headscarf 
and the practice of female circumcision, questions are raised as to whether Islam and human rights, 
especially women’s rights, are truly incompatible or whether there are other issues at stake.  It also 
discusses the defamation of religions, particularly Islam, and the recent steps taken by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in relation to this issue.  The paper concludes by providing 
some insights into the likely future direction that the headscarf debate may take in New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
1 A reference to Herman Salton’s article ‘“Veiled Threats?” Islam, Headscarves and Freedom of 
Religion in France and the United States’ in NZPGLeJ [2005/1] UPD1, hereinafter referred to as 
Salton.  The terms “headscarf”, “veil” and “hijab” (the Arabic term for “veil”) are used 
interchangeably in this article as they are all taken to refer to the same thing, namely, a  piece of 
material worn on the female head that covers the hair and neck but leaves the face uncovered.  For a 
description of the variations between Islamic headscarves, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ 
europe/3328277.stm  (at 16 April 2005).  
2 BA, LLB (Hons) University of Otago; LLM (Hons) University of Waikato; Barrister and Solicitor 
of the High Court of New Zealand; PhD Candidate at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New 
Zealand.  The current article is unrelated to the author’s PhD thesis. 
3 ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary New Revised Edition, 
(Amana Corporation, Maryland, 1989) p106.  Since Muslims regard the Arabic Qur’an (literally, “the 
Recitation”) as a divine proclamation from God (Allah), revealed to the prophet Mohammed through 
the angel Gabriel, only the Arabic text can be referred to as “The Qur’an”.  Any translations of the 
Arabic Qur’an, whether they are in English or in any other language, are nothing more than that: 
mere translations.  Translations are never referred to by Muslims as “The Qur’an”.   Whereas 
translations will differ from one to another, all copies of the Qur’an are identical. 
4 King James Version of the Bible, available online at http://www.hti.umich.edu/k/kjv/ (at 16 April 
2005).  This particular quotation from the Bible is also used by Aesha Lorenz Al-Saeed, “Behind the 
Veil: Women’s Headscarves in Schools” 4 April 2003, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ 
HL0304/S00040.htm  (at 16 April 2005).  
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I           THE HEADSCARF AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS:  
PROTECTING FRENCH SCHOOLGIRLS 
 
One of the core justifications for the French Government’s decision to impose a 
ban on the wearing of headscarves in French schools was apparently the “desire to 
protect young girls who are obliged to wear the headscarf”.5  Herman Salton, in an 
article published in the inaugural issue of the New Zealand Postgraduate Law e-
Journal, explained that the two main rationales for the ban were, first, an apparent 
desire on the part of the French government to protect French schoolgirls’ rights 
and, second, to reassert women’s equality with men.6   
 
The allegations leveled at the headscarf were, inter alia, that it was being forced upon 
young girls, it was “infringing upon women’s fundamental rights, on a daily basis,” 
and that it was undermining the equality of the sexes.7   French President, Jacques 
Chirac, also believes that French people see “something aggressive” in the headscarf, 
explaining that "wearing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of aggression that 
is difficult for us to accept." 8  
 
This attack on the headscarf, viewed by Muslim women and men the world over as a 
mark of modesty and piety, rather than as a concession of women’s inequality or an 
act of aggression, seems to be based on either misinformation or a lack of credible 
information.  The French Government’s 20-member commission (led by former 
minister Bernard Stasi) which was responsible for the report that contained a 
recommendation to ban the headscarf from state schools, does not appear to have 
surveyed the estimated 1,500 – 5000 wearers of the headscarf to determine whether 
they felt that it reduced their equality with men (or boys) or whether it infringed 
upon their “fundamental rights on a daily basis”.  There seems to have been an 
abject lack of interest in hearing what the girls who wore the headscarves had to say, 
whether they were wearing them by force or whether their choice of headwear was a 
voluntary one. Moreover, it may have been informative to ask their classmates 
whether they felt a class member wearing a headscarf made them feel 
uncomfortable, “pressured”, or “provoked” in some way.9  Instead, the opponents of 
the headscarf relied on perceptions of what the headscarf meant to its opponents, 
                                                 
5 See Salton, above n 1, 21, n 61.  The French ban on the wearing of headscarves in state schools was 
passed in March 2004 and came into effect in September 2004. 
6 Ibid 5-6.  Salton states that the two main issues that led to the ban were the defence of the ideal of 
laïcité and the protection of women’s rights. 
7 Ibid 23, citing the Rapport de la Commission de Réflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laïcité 
dans la République, the Travaux Préparatoires and the Circulaire 2004-084, see Salton, above n 1, fn 
63-68, fn 61 and fn 62 respectively.  See also Salton, above n 1, 8, n 22, 23. 
8 Chirac’s words reported by Jon Henley, “Something aggressive about veils, says Chirac” The 
Guardian 6 December 2003, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/ 
0,11882,1101321,00.html (at 16 April 2005). 
9 In 1989, a French court ruled that the wearing of religious insignia in state schools was permissible 
as long as it was not done with the aim of “pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda”.  
Hence, much of the debate focused on whether headscarves fell into these categories: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3328277.stm   (at 16 April 2005). 
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perceptions formed mainly (though not exclusively) by non-Muslims, who did not 
wear nor likely ever would wear a headscarf for religious reasons.  
 
A  The decision to wear a headscarf 
 
It may be true that some wearers of the headscarf were asked or maybe even (God 
forbid) told to wear it by their parents.  That allegation, however, could not be made 
regarding Alma and Lila Lévy, the French schoolgirls who were excluded from their 
high school for insisting on wearing the headscarf, since their father is Jewish and 
their Algerian Muslim mother was reported in the media as choosing not to wear the 
headscarf herself. However, even if one presumes that some French schoolgirls were 
told by their parents to wear a headscarf, that doesn’t necessarily imply that they 
were being discriminated against and in need of protection in the form of a 
nationwide-law banning all headscarves from state schools.  In France, as 
everywhere, parents often try to influence the clothing that their children choose to 
wear in an effort to ensure that their children are dressed appropriately – nothing 
new in that.   
 
In New Zealand, all children (and adults) are forced to wear protective clothing on 
their heads, whenever they cycle to or from school, or anywhere else.10  The wearing 
of the helmet is forced upon New Zealand children by law (and hopefully also by 
parents) because it is seen as a way of helping to prevent head injuries caused by 
cycling accidents.  For girls who have reached or are nearing the age of puberty, the 
headscarf is also seen by its wearers (and sometimes their parents) as a kind of 
protection.  Unlike the helmet, which protects the head from physical injuries, the 
headscarf is perceived by those Muslims who choose to wear it as a way of 
preserving a female’s modesty and protecting her from the unwelcome attention of 
men.11  The similarity between the helmet and the headscarf is somewhat limited, 
however, since the helmet is compulsory attire for all cyclists in New Zealand12 but 
the Islamic headscarf is never obligatory – it is always (or always should be) the 
choice of the individual girl/woman whether or not it is worn.  There is no 
compulsion in religion, or at least, not in Islam.13
 
It is a fact that many women who were not born into the religion of Islam have 
chosen to become Muslim and have adopted the wearing of the headscarf, 
                                                 
10 Traffic Regulations 1974, Amendment No 24, regulation 38A. 
11 The inherent attractiveness of a woman’s hair, particularly long hair, seems to have been 
understood in the New Testament of the Bible, as this is understood to be the meaning of 1 
Corinthians chapter 11, verses 14 and 15, see King James Version of the Bible, above p 2, n 4. 
12 Unless they apply for and are granted an exemption, for example, on religious grounds. 
13 The principle that there is no compulsion in religion is clearly stated in the Qur’an: see translation 
of ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali, surah Al-Baqarah, verse 253, above p 2, n 3. ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s 
commentary on this verse attempts to explain its meaning as follows: “Compulsion is incompatible 
with religion: because (1) religion depends upon faith and will, and these would be meaningless if 
induced by force…”; see Yusuf Ali’s translation, supra n 3 at p106.  Applying to the French 
schoolgirls, it is clear that they ought never to be forced to wear the headscarf, since wearing it is an 
act of faith and will. 
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voluntarily.  They are neither children nor are they under their husband’s often-
alleged domination.14  This has occurred in France as elsewhere in the world.  
Women who have chosen to wear the headscarf of their own volition often report 
that they enjoy wearing it, because they say it provides “peace, freedom and dignity, 
and no fear of being possessed by strangers.”15  Western Muslim women also report 
that they feel pride when wearing the hijab,16 that they feel protected from the 
harassment of men when wearing the hijab,17 and they see the hijab as a “protection 
of the modesty of women and society as a whole”.18
 
Aside from grown women, many children or young adults choose to wear the 
headscarf, some from an early age, because they feel that they are obeying God’s 
command to them in the Qur’an:19
 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; 
that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) 
appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their 
beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their 
husband’s sons… 
 
The conundrum is this: how is it possible that Muslim women see the headscarf as a 
method of protecting their modesty and obeying God when the French Parliament 
sees the headscarf as an attempt to undermine the equality of the sexes and as an 
infringement of girls’ fundamental rights?  How is it possible that the French 
Parliament has banned headscarves in schools in an effort to protect fundamental 
                                                 
14 One might argue that female children are forced to wear the headscarf by their parents, and that 
Muslim women born into the religion are forced to wear it by their oppressive husbands.  Neither of 
these criticisms is valid when the woman is an adult, and has grown up in the West, and moreover, is 
often not married. 
15 Khaula Nakata, “A View Through Hijab” in The Hijab…Why? Dr Saleh As-Saleh (trans) (The Co-
operative Office for Call & Guidance at Badiah, Riyadh, 1995) 4.  Nakata, a Japanese woman who 
became Muslim, explains why she chose not only to wear the hijab, but also the nikab (face 
covering).  Incidentally, Tokyo has recently begun its first women-only subway car during the 
morning rush hour in a bid to clamp down on groping, which is reported to be rampant on Tokyo’s 
crowded trains.  A police report in February 2005 said that groping on trains had tripled over the past 
eight years.  Other Japanese cities, such as Osaka, have already introduced women-only cars during 
rush hour: Aljazeera.net “Japan women get own subway cars”: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C624B9D1-7435-4EF5-A611 FF2B39A04B4F.htm (at 4 
April 2005).  Segregation of the sexes is not, then, a purely Islamic practice, and it would seem to 
have benefits in Western states which pride themselves on the “equality” of the sexes, such as Japan.  
16 Sumeyra Dyer in Islam: Our Choice (Muslim Converts Support Group of Australia, Victoria, 
1995) 4. 
17 Ruth Anderson in Hijab (Veil): The View From the Inside (World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 
Riyadh, 1995) 17.  Anderson, an American woman who became Muslim, stated that when asked to 
discard her hijab or expose that part of her body ordered to be covered by the Divine Law (that is, 
the Qur’an) she felt that she was being asked to disobey Islamic principles and her basic belief: Ibid 
20. 
18 Aminah Riddle in Islam: Our Choice (Muslim Converts Support Group of Australia, Victoria, 
1995) 32. 
19 Surah Al Nur (The Light), verse 31 [abbreviated], English translation of the Qur’an by ‘Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, above n 3. 
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rights, when Muslim women (and presumably some girls) see it as their fundamental 
right to cover their heads and dress modestly?  Do Muslim schoolgirls have to 
remove their headscarves in order to experience equality and freedom of religion?  
 
B   Protecting women’s rights or ulterior motives? 
 
The authors of the Stasi report and the French Government were content for the 
public to perceive the headscarf-in-schools debate as being based on the issue of 
equality between the sexes and women’s rights.  But if that were true, one would 
have expected a great deal more interest to have been shown in trying to understand 
why girls wanted to wear the headscarf.  Had there been a genuine desire to 
understand why the headscarf is so important to those who wear it – not just to 
those who look at it – there may not have been the same level of support for a 
legislative ban.   
 
The overwhelming public and parliamentary support for a ban on headscarves may 
stem not from a desire to protect French schoolgirls, but from two age-old 
concepts, fear and misunderstanding.  Samuel Huntington has cited a 1991 study in 
France which showed that the four countries feared most by the French public were 
all Muslim: Iraq (52 percent); Iran (25 percent); Libya (26 percent) and Algeria (22 
percent).20  Western political leaders, including the French prime minister, declared 
in 1995 that Islamic fundamentalism was “at least as dangerous as communism” to 
the West.21   Salton, in his article, also noted the apparent fear that the French public 
experience at the sight of the headscarf.22  It is suggested that a general fear of Islam, 
a misunderstanding about the reasons why the headscarf is worn and a strong desire 
to halt the perceived influence of Islamic “fundamentalism” had more impact on the 
banning of the headscarf than did the stated objectives, especially the supposed 
objective of protecting the girls themselves and upholding women’s rights.23   
 
II FEMALE CIRCUMCISION – A “TENET” OF ISLAM? 
 
The Stasi commission’s report described the headscarf as representing a “resurgence 
of sexism, that translates into pressures as well as verbal, psychological and physical 
violence.”24  It linked the headscarf to other practices such as female genital 
mutilation and polygamy, perhaps hoping that in making such a link, the headscarf 
                                                 
i i  20 Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of C vilizat ons and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and 
Schuster, Great Britain, 2002) 215, citing a survey that appeared in Le Monde on 20 September 1991. 
21 Huntington, above n 20, 215. 
22 See Salton, above n 1, at 5-7, n 15. 
23 The term “fundamentalism” is placed in quotation marks here because it is a problematic value-
laden term which, when used to describe a group, carries inherently negative connotations.  The 
perception seems to be that headscarf-wearers are “fundamentalists”, but as the quote from the 
Qur’an shows (see above n 3) it is a requirement for Muslim women to cover their heads.  Thus, any 
Muslim woman who chooses not to cover her head is not adhering to one of the tenets of her 
religion.  A woman who chooses to cover her head should not then be labeled as a “fundamentalist,” 
she should perhaps be described as a practising Muslim. 
24 See Salton, above n 1, 8, n22.  The translation cited here is Salton’s. 
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would be tainted by the negativity generated by these concepts.  There is nothing 
new or novel in these tactics.  As Salton has described, the relationship between 
Islam and the West has often been strained, due in large part to misunderstandings 
and exaggerated or inaccurate accounts about Islamic beliefs and practices.25  
 
Unfortunately, Salton may have inadvertently added to this body of misconception.  
After mentioning the practical problems that may arise in accommodating the tenets 
of Islam in civic life, and adducing a list of possible confrontations between Islam 
and the State, he goes on to conclude that:26
 
These are very delicate matters where balancing freedom of religion and efficiency of the 
public service can prove extraordinarily difficult.  Moreover, they are quite apart from the 
even more contentious issue of whether some Islamic tenets violate basic human rights for 
women – something that practices like circumcision and arranged marriages seem to suggest. 
(emphasis added)   
 
The false assumption, that female circumcision is an “Islamic tenet”, is often made 
when adducing evidence of Islam’s incompatibility with Western values, especially 
its alleged incompatibility with women’s fundamental human rights.  Attaining 
clarity on this issue is essential to dispelling concerns that Islam and the West are 
inherently incompatible. 
 
A    A  Definition of  “ emale circumcision” f
                                                
 
The term “female circumcision” is used to refer to a wide range of procedures:27
 
The simplest form involves a small cut to the clitoris or labial tissue. A Sunna circumcision 
removes the prepuce (a fold of skin that covers the clitoris) and/or the tip of the clitoris. A 
clitoridectomy removes the entire clitoris and some or all of the surrounding tissue. The 
most extreme form of genital mutilation is excision and infibulation, in which the clitoris 
and all of the surrounding tissue are cut away and the remaining skin is sewn together. Only 
a small opening is left for the passage of urine and menstrual blood. 
 
It is clear from the above medical description that so-called Sunna circumcision28 
(removal of the prepuce or covering of the clitoris, not the clitoris itself) is 
practically different from a clitoridectomy (complete excision of the clitoris) and 
infibulation (complete excision of the clitoris, the surrounding tissue and then the 
sewing together of the remaining tissue), sometimes referred to as “Pharaonic 
circumcision”.  The first procedure is arguably comparable with male circumcision, 
in that it only involves the removal of the prepuce, or hood, of the clitoris, whilst 
 
25 Salton, above n 1, 20-21. 
26 Ibid 25. 
27 Dr Joseph F Smith Medical Library, available at http://www.chclibrary.org/micromed/ 
00048160.html (at 27 April 2005). 
28 “Sunna” means “tradition” in Arabic and usually refers to the traditions or ways of the Prophet 
Mohammed. 
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the latter two procedures are more extreme, sometimes referred to as “female genital 
mutilation” (“FGM”), and have no comparable male procedure.   
 
Although there is a practical distinction between the different procedures, the 
World Health Organisation presently refers to all of them under the term FGM.29  
Most international and domestic instruments adopt the same definitional approach.  
In this article, the former, less radical procedure (“Sunna circumcision”) is referred 
to as female circumcision,30 and the latter two, more extreme procedures are referred 
to jointly as FGM.31  It is acknowledged that some writers prefer to use a more 
general, non-politicised description of the procedures, such as “female genital 
modification” or “female genital cutting”, arguing that the term FGM is an 
ethnocentric, and therefore, inappropriate term.32
 
B   A “tenet” of Islam? 
 
The apparently widely-held perception that female circumcision and/or FGM are an 
“Islamic tenet” is negated by the following four observations. First, female 
circumcision and FGM predate Islam.  These practices have been traced back to 
antiquity, and were probably first recorded as being practiced in the second century 
BC.33  A Greek geographer, Agatharchides of Cnidus, apparently wrote about FGM 
being practised on the western coast of the Red Sea, modern day Egypt, in around 
132BC.34  However, its true origins probably lie even further back in time, in 
Pharaonic Egypt, where it is claimed to have arisen out of the ancient Egyptian 
belief in the bisexuality of the gods.35  Boyle suggests that although female genital 
cutting pre-dates Islam, such modesty conventions “corresponded with Islamic 
                                                 
29 The United Nations’ terminology was changed from “female circumcision” to “female genital 
mutilation” in 1991 on the recommendation of the WHO. 
30 Amnesty International describes the procedure which involves only the removal of the clitoral 
hood as “the least radical procedure”:  see Amnesty International, “What is Female Genital 
Mutilation” available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm (at 28 April 2005). 
31 Many descriptions of female circumcision and FGM adopt a 4-type analysis.  They add an 
additional type of procedure which ranges from a symbolic pricking of blood to a number of other 
possible practices such as stretching the clitoris, cauterization by burning and so on.  For a 
description of the standard four types, see, for example, Ocnus.net “When culture harms the girls” 
(23 March 2005) available at http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive= 66&num=17302 
(at 28 April 2005). 
32 See Elizabeth Heger Boyle  Female Genital Cutting: Cultura Conflict in the Global Communi y 
(John Hopkins University Press, 2002)  4-6. 
l t
i
33 Therefore, it was occurring approximately 800 years before Islam, which is usually said to have 
begun in 610AD, being the year that the Prophet Mohammad received the first revelations.  But note 
that Muslims do not regard Islam as having such a commencement date since they regard all prophets 
as being Muslim, starting with Adam and including Moses and Jesus, with Mohammed being the last 
of the Prophets. 
34 Agatharchides of Cnidus, a Greek philosopher, historian and geographer, wrote five books in 
around 132BC, entitled “Journey around the Red Sea” or “On the Red Sea”. 
35 Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Female Gen tal Cutting above n 32 at 27. 
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ideals of family honour and female chastity and seclusion.”36  This may have 
contributed to the widespread adoption of the practice in the area.37
 
Second, female circumcision and FGM are currently not practised by all Muslims, 
nor by all Arabs.38  Most of the Maghreb countries, as well as Turkey and Iran, 
ignore the practices altogether, and it is not common in the Middle East.  Neither 
are these practices common in the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia, being confined 
there to immigrants and some Bedouin tribes.39  The less invasive practice of female 
circumcision is mainly practised by the Bedouin in Israel.40   
 
According to Amnesty International, FGM “is practised extensively in Africa and is 
common in some countries in the Middle East. It also occurs, mainly among 
immigrant communities, in parts of Asia and the Pacific, North and Latin America 
and Europe.”41  Female circumcision and FGM are often performed in African 
nations as rites of initiation into adulthood, rather than for religious reasons.  The 
late President of Kenya, referring to the practice among the Kikuyu people, claimed 
that FGM was inherent in the initiation into adulthood and was an inherent part of 
being Kikuyu.42
 
Third, female circumcision and FGM have been practised by Western doctors in 
non-Muslim countries, such as Australia, the United States and Great Britain, who 
previously supported its use as a medical cure for a range of (alleged) psychological 
aliments, such as nymphomania.43  In the United States, female circumcision and the 
more extreme procedures of clitoridectomy and infibulation (FGM), were 
prescribed for patients up until 1925, and perhaps even as late as the 1950s, as a 
method of controlling and suppressing female sexuality. Presently, the practice of 
female circumcision (as that term is used in this article, namely, only the removal of 
the prepuce, or hood, of the clitoris) is considered to be a form of elective surgery, 
performed by some plastic surgeons at the choice of women, for the purposes of 
enhancing sexual response.44  
                                                 
36 Ibid 27. 
37 Ibid  28. 
38 By “Islamic tenet” one presumes that Salton has in mind a principle, belief or theory that belongs 
to Islam and is practised by all, or at last the majority of Muslims, although Salton himself does not 
define the term. 
39 See Sami A Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh “Legitimization of Male and Female Circumcision” Medicine and 
Law  (July 1994) Vol 13, No7-8, 575-622, available at http://www.cirp.org/ 
library/cultural/aldeeb1/#n19 (at 27 April 2005).   
40 See Elizabeth Heger Boyle, above n 32, at 25, citing a study by Asali et al in 1995. 
41 Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm#a11  (at 27 April 
2005). 
42 Jomo Kenyatta, late President of Kenya, quoted by Amnesty International at 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm#a3  (at 27 April 2005).   
43 See Elizabeth A Esterbrooks, “Female Genital Mutilation”, Model United Nations Far West – 50th 
Session available at: http://www.munfw.org/archive/50th/who2.htm  (at 27 April 2005). 
44 For further information on this elective procedure, see the “Clitoral Hood Information Page”, 
available at: http://www.geocities.com/hoodectomy/hoodectomy.html  (at 27 April 2005).  
 9
THE NEW ZEALAND POSTGRADUATE LAW E-JOURNAL (NZPGLeJ) - ISSUE 2 / 2005 
 
Fourth, female circumcision and FMG are currently practised by several non-
Muslim groups, such as Coptic Christians in Egypt, Ethiopian Jews and African 
animist tribes.  In Tanzania, regions that are predominantly Christian have the 
highest percentages of circumcised women.45  Presently, the World Health 
Organisation estimates that there are approximately 100 to 140 million girls and 
women throughout the world who have undergone some form of FGM procedure, 
the majority of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa.46  FGM procedures are common in 
25 (some say 28)47 African countries, being practised by individuals who hold a 
range of religious and cultural beliefs.  Amnesty International states that, “FGM 
predates Islam and is not practised by the majority of Muslims, but has acquired a 
religious dimension.48  In light of the fact that female circumcision and FGM are 
practices that are confined to neither Muslims nor Arabs, it is argued that it is 
misleading to refer to either female circumcision or FGM as an “Islamic tenet”. 
 
C   The Islamic perspective on female circumcision and FGM 
 
Islamic law has two main sources:  the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
Mohammed.  The Sunnah (literally “the way” that the Prophet Mohammed lived his 
life) is known to us via a compilation of reports from different sources, called the 
Hadith.  Two additional but weaker sources of law are Qiyas, the process of 
analogical reasoning from a known junction to a new junction, that is, applying 
known law to new situations, and finally, the ijtihad (independent thought to arrive 
at a consensus), including the tenets of the schools of Muslim law through the 
centuries. Opinions of Muslim scholars (fatwas, or legal opinions) are an important 
part of ijttihad.   
 
The first two sources of Islamic law (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) contain aspects of 
the religion that are binding on Muslims, whereas fatwas are morally forceful but 
not legally binding.  Different scholars often issue different fatwas on the same 
issue, depending on their interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.   
 
Neither male nor female circumcision are specifically mentioned in the Qur’an, 
therefore, it is the Sunnah and the scholars’ fatwas that are the sources of the Islamic 
perspective on this subject. 
                                                 
45 See Boyle, above n 32, at 31. 
46 Department of Gender and Women’s Health, World Health Organisation (WHO), “Female 
Genital Mutilation: The prevention and the management of the health complications - Policy 
guidelines for nurses and midwives” WHO/FCH/GWH/01.5, WHO/RHR/01.18 (World Health 
Organisation, Geneva, 2001) 4 [hereinafter referred to as “the WHO report”]. 
47 Amnesty International lists 28 countries as actively practising some form of female circumcision or 
FGM, with an estimate of the percentage of women girls in each country who undergo a procedure.  
The percentages range from 5% in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, to 98% in 
Somalia: see http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm9.htm  (at 27 April 2005).   
48 See Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm#a11  (at 27 
April 2005).   
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There are a range of opinions amongst Islamic scholars as to the status of both 
female circumcision and FGM in Islamic law.   At one end of the spectrum, 
Canadian academic Sheikh Ahmed Kutty takes the view that, whilst circumcision 
for boys is obligatory, there is no evidence in either the Qur’an or the Sunnah that 
suggests it is compulsory for women.49  Kutty draws a comparison between men and 
women who converted to Islam at the time of the Prophet Mohammed:50
 
While one finds a number of traditions from the Prophet, peace and blessings be 
upon him, which clearly indicates that he ordered pagan males who converted to 
undergo circumcision, it is not stated anywhere that the Prophet, peace and 
blessings be upon him, ordered any woman who entered Islam to undergo this 
practice. 
 
Kutty’s view finds support from the highest Sunni Muslim authority in Egypt, a 
country where female circumcision and FGM are widely practised.  In 1997, in the 
midst of a legal attempt to overturn the Egyptian Health Minister’s controversial 
ban on FGM procedures, Sheikh Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi, then (and presently) 
head of Al-Azhar University, stated that: “The 'ulemas' (theologians) of Islam are 
unanimous in agreeing that female circumcision has nothing to do with religion."51  
That view was not shared by all Islamic scholars in Egypt.52
 
There are also scholars who state that Islam permits female circumcision, but not 
the extreme form of FGM (including infibulation) practised mainly in Africa.  The 
Egyptian-born President of the European Council on Fatwa and Research, Sheikh 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, takes the view that female circumcision is not a religious 
obligation and whoever chooses not to do it is not committing a sin.  However, he 
                                                 
49 Sheikh Ahmed Kutty is a senior lecturer and an Islamic scholar at the Islamic Institute of Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada. 
50  Sheikh Ahmad Kutty, “Female Circumcision: Is it really obligatory?” (28 August 2002) 
IslamOnline - Fatwa Bank, available at: http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/ 
FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=79655   (at 27 April 2005).   Kutty goes on to observe that:  “It is 
common knowledge in Islam that if the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, had wanted 
female circumcision to be an integral aspect of religious practice in Islam in the same way that male 
circumcision is, he would have said so clearly. Since he did not do so, we can safely assume it is not a 
prescribed ritual of Islam." 
51 See “Egyptian Ban on Female Circumcision Upheld” BBC News, 28 December 1997, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/42914.stm  (at 27 April 2005).  Al-Azhar University is regarded as 
being the most highly respected Islamic university in the world.  Tantawi was appointed the head 
imam in 1996. 
52 Sheikh Gadd al-Haqq, a prominent Islamic cleric in Egypt, issued a fatwa stating that although 
female genital cutting was not required by Islam, it was nevertheless a religious custom and an 
honourable deed for women.  He recommended local clerics to encourage families to circumcise their 
daughters, just as they encourage individuals to pray.  That fatwa led to a lawsuit, brought by the 
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, which alleged, inter alia, that Gad el-Haqq had 
misrepresented the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed by equating the circumcision of girls with 
that of boys.  The lawsuit was dismissed on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing:  see Elizabeth 
Heger Boyle Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflic  in the Global Community (John Hopkins 
University Press, 2002) above n 32, 3-4. 
t
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states that he personally supports the practice of moderate Islamic female 
circumcision (removal of the prepuce, or covering, of the clitoris) and “whoever 
finds it serving the interests of his daughters should do it”.53  He bases his fatwa on a 
Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed who is reported to have said to a midwife who 
practiced FGM before the time of Islam:  “if you cut, do not overdo it because it 
brings more radiance to the woman and it is more pleasant for the husband.”54  Al-
Qaradawi interprets that Hadith to mean that female circumcision (the removal of 
only the prepuce), which was being practised before Islam, is permitted because it is 
“better for a woman’s health and improves her conjugal relation with her 
husband.”55    
 
There are two other Hadiths which specifically mention female circumcision and are 
often quoted by supporters of the practice.  One Hadith reports that the Prophet 
Mohammed stipulated: "If both circumcised parts meet or if they touch each other, 
it is necessary to wash before prayer".56  From this, it may be deduced that men and 
women were circumcised in the Prophet Mohammed's time but this in itself does 
not shed much light on whether it was a permitted, recommended or obligatory 
practice.  It is merely an acknowledgement that men and women were sometimes 
both circumcised, and that they both had to purify themselves before prayer.  The 
other Hadith reports that the Prophet Mohammed said: "Circumcision is a sunnah 
for the men and makrumah for the women".57  The term ‘sunnah’ here means that it 
conforms to the tradition of Mohammed and “makrumah” means a combination of 
modesty, dignity and pride.58  However, this latter Hadith is regarded as being a 
‘weak Hadith’ due to concerns over the chain of narration. 
 
Based on the foregoing Hadiths and scholarly exposition, the following conclusions 
can be drawn. First, female circumcision was practised before Islam, and the practice 
was allowed to continue but only if those performing it did not “overdo it” or 
“exaggerate”.  Female circumcision (the removal of the prepuce) is therefore a 
                                                 
53 See Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s fatwa on female circumcision at IslamOnline, available at: 
http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=31397  (at 27 April 2005).  
54 This Hadith was narrated by Umm-Attiyah (a woman who heard a conversation between 
Mohammed and a midwife).   Instead of “radiance to the woman”, it is sometimes translated as 
“radiance to the face”.  Umm-Attiyah related many Hadiths and is generally regarded as being 
reliable.   It is often quoted as the main evidence for female circumcision. Another translation of this 
Hadith reads: Cut slightly without exaggeration (ikhtafidna wa-la tanhikna), because it is more 
pleasant (ahza) for your husbands". 
55 Ibid.  
56 Hadith related by Al-Turmuzy, in Tuhfet al-Maudood, p117. Al-Turmuzy is generally regarded as a 
strong or reliable narrator of Hadiths. The translation of the Arabic into English is that of an Arabic 
speaker but not an official translator.  
57 This Hadith was first related by Ibn-Abbas, and also by Ahmad, Hadith no. 5/75, and Al-Bahaqi 
Hadith no.8/325.  This Hadith is regarded as being “maoqouf” and “marfo’a” which means either 
that one of the people in the chain of narrations is missing, or one of the people in the chain of 
narrations has related other Hadiths of questionable reliability.  Therefore, this reduces the reliability 
of this Hadith and it is therefore called a “weak Hadith”. 
58 The translations of Arabic terms into English are those of an Arabic speaker but not an official 
translator. 
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permitted practice but it is certainly not obligatory.  It has a different status in Islam 
to the practice of male circumcision (which also involves the removal of the 
prepuce), which is generally regarded as obligatory for all Muslim boys and men.59   
 
Second, the extreme forms of FGM (such as excision and infibulation) are 
forbidden in Islam.  The Prophet Mohammed’s express limitation on the practice of 
female circumcision was that if it was done, it should not be exaggerated. 
 
Third, some scholars claim that even before the less invasive practice of female 
circumcision (the removal of the prepuce) can be performed, certain conditions 
must be met, such as that the girl/woman must be medically examined to determine 
whether the procedure is necessary.  For some women, who are born without a 
prepuce, the procedure would be unnecessary and illogical, even if it were desired.  
In other cases, it is claimed that a girl or woman may have a physical abnormality 
which warrants the procedure.60  Also, if it is going to be performed, it must be done 
by a medical professional using appropriate medical equipment which has been 
properly sterilised, in order to avoid the risk of infection.61   
 
In summary, the weight of evidence would support the view that Islam permits the 
pre-Islamic practice of female circumcision to continue, but it is not obligatory. If it 
is performed, it must not be extreme and certain conditions, such as physiological 
need and medical expertise must be met.  However, it is forbidden to carry out 
extreme FGM procedures such as infibulation in Islamic law.   
 
As a footnote to this analysis on Islam’s position, it is interesting to note that some 
Western gynaecologists still support the practice of female circumcision for patients 
who suffer from sexual dysfunction caused by anatomical disorders.  Researchers at 
the Boston University School of Medicine found that roughly one quarter of the 
women they treated suffered from a condition called “clitoral phimosis” and that 
female circumcision (removal of the prepuce) could be of assistance in treating this 
condition.62  This may lend support to the Islamic practice of allowing the procedure 
in some circumstances, providing the conditions outlined above (medical 
examination, physiological need, medical professionals, proper equipment) are met. 
 
                                                 
59 There have been some calls, particularly in the United States, to also ban male circumcision – so-
called male genital mutilation “MGM” – but so far this has not received much support, probably due 
in part to the fact that over 50% of American boys are estimated to be circumcised and, unlike female 
genital mutilation, there are said to be no long-term negative side effects of male circumcision. 
60 This position can be reconciled with Western medical practices, where the removal of the female 
prepuce is sometimes performed as elective surgery on women. 
61 These conditions, based on the Sunnah, are reasoned to exist by Sheikh Yousef bin Abdullah Al-
Uraifi, The Manners of receiving a Newborn in Islam (Al-Watan, Riyadh, 1412 Hijiri, 1997) 77.  The 
translation of this text from Arabic into English is by an Arabic speaker but it is not an official 
translation. 
62 See Scientific American.com 31 October 2000 “Anatomy and Sexual Dysfunction” available at: 
http://www.geocities.com/hoodectomy/hoodectomy.html  (at 28 April 2005). 
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D    Female genital mutilation  and international law 
 
The extreme procedure of FGM is not only forbidden in Islam but it is widely 
regarded internationally as a violation of women’s and girls’ human rights.  A 
number of international instruments have been adopted in an attempt to eradicate 
this inhumane practice.63  The United Nations has been at the forefront of this 
campaign and has enacted conventions relating to women’s rights and children’s 
rights which address violence against women on religious or cultural grounds, 
including the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”).64  The monitoring body of CEDAW, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, has issued several 
recommendations relating specifically to FGM.  General Recommendation 14 
(1990) calls on states parties to take appropriate and effective measures with a view 
to eradicating the practice, including introducing appropriate health care and 
education strategies and including information about measures taken to eliminate 
FGM in their reports to the Committee.65  The UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
protects the rights of the child against abuse carried out in the name of a particular 
belief or cultural tradition, stating that: "Practices of a religion or belief in which a 
child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his 
full development..." (Article 5(5)).   
 
In short, there are many international instruments which seek to eradicate the 
practice of FGM.  The fact that the international instruments address the practice of 
FGM wherever it is carried out, rather than classifying it as a practice that is 
confined to Muslims, serves to underline the point that FGM is a widespread 
practice that is not confined to Muslim populations.  The fact that such a diverse 
range of instruments have been enacted is also evidence that FGM is performed for 
a diverse range of reasons: some religious (based on Muslim, Christian, Jew and 
animist beliefs); some based on ideas of hygiene, cleanliness, and health; some based 
on gender identity, some based on the need to control women’s sexuality and 
reproductive functions and some based on cultural identity.66   
 
                                                 
63 See the WHO report, above n 46, 6-9. 
64 The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which 
came into force in 1981, contains an article which indirectly addresses the problem: Article 5 of the 
Convention requires states to work towards "the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes".   
65 See also Amnesty International, Female Genital Mutilation available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm5.htm  (at 28 April 2005). 
66 Ibid. 
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E  Domestic law 
 
In Africa, 14 countries have enacted laws criminalising FGM.67  In industrialized 
nations, 11 states have passed laws regarding FGM.68  Some Western states also have 
enacted laws which forbid girls from being taken out of the jurisdiction for purposes 
of having the procedure carried out.69  Western states’ legislation usually does not 
draw a distinction between female circumcision, as that term is used here, and FGM, 
preferring to prohibit any and all practices that “mutilate in whole or in part” the 
female genitalia.70
 
F   The link between female genital mutilation and the headscarf debate in France 
 
The Stasi report that recommended the banning of the headscarf in French public 
schools specifically referred to female sexual mutilation, perhaps trying to imply 
that it is one of the supposed outcomes of allowing girls to wear a headscarf.71  In 
making this connection, the authors of the report showed how such imagery could 
be manipulated to convince the public that the headscarf was just another way, like 
FGM, of violating girls’ and women’s rights.  It is suggested that simply mentioning 
the phrase “female circumcision” or “sexual mutilation” is bound to add weight to 
one’s argument, in much the same way as using the term “terrorism” to describe 
one’s enemies gives one the immediate moral high ground.  The distinction between 
female circumcision (the removal of the prepuce) and FGM (complete excision 
and/or infibulation) is not a distinction that is made by most people, and was not 
made by the authors of the Stasi report.  The term “female circumcision” is usually 
taken by the public to mean the same thing as FGM. 
 
It is submitted that Western secular states, such as France ought to openly 
acknowledge that the practice of FGM, whilst clearly a violation of females’ human 
                                                 
67 Centre for Reproductive Rights, 27 February 2005, available at: http://www.crlp.org/ 
pub_fac_fgmicpd.html  (at 28 April 2005).  The 14 African countries (with the year enacted in 
brackets) are: Benin (2003); Burkina Faso (1996); Central African Republic (1966); Chad (2003); 
Côte d'Ivoire (1998); Djibouti (1994); Egypt (Ministerial Decree, 1996); Ethiopia (2004); Ghana 
(1994); Guinea (1965); Kenya (2001); Niger (2003); Senegal (1999); Tanzania (1998); Togo (1998); 
Nigeria (multiple states, 1999-2002): see the Centre for Reproductive Rights. 
68 The Centre for Reproductive Rights lists 10 states: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.  France is missing from 
this list because it doesn’t have specific FGM legislation, but FGM is also illegal in France under 
article 312 of the Penal Code. 
69 For example, the United Kingdom has enacted the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 which 
provides in section 3(1) that it is an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure a person who is not a 
United Kingdom national or permanent United Kingdom resident to do a relevant act of female 
genital mutilation outside the United Kingdom: see http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2003/20030031.htm  (at 28 April 2005). 
70 That phrase is taken from the definition of female genital mutilation in the United Kingdom’s 
legislation. 
71 See extract from the report in Salton, above n 1, p 22, n 66. 
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rights, is not restricted to Muslim societies.72  Equally as importantly, Western states 
such as France ought to acknowledge that FGM is not required by Islam, but that, 
on the contrary, it is forbidden in Islam.  The evidence provided above shows that 
FGM is not presently, nor has it ever been, an Islamic tenet, as implied by the Stasi 
report and expressly stated by Salton.73  Misunderstanding of this fact can lead to 
only further mistrust of Islam, especially its treatment of girls and women.  It 
should be stated clearly that the only obligatory circumcision in Islamic law is male 
circumcision, according to scholars of the highest eminence.74   
 
Despite many Islamic scholars having repeated this point, the perception still 
remains that FGM is a “tenet” of Islam.75  Educating governments and the greater 
public about religious beliefs and practices might be the only way to solve the 
“formidable” problems of integrating Islam with Western societies to which Salton 
refers.  Educating Muslims about the status of female circumcision and FMG in 
Islam would be an integral part of this process. 
 
III  “IRRATIONAL” RELIGIONS AND “RATIONAL” LAWS 
 
If investigation, inquiry and education are possibly the best way forward, then 
describing religion as being, by its own nature, “irrational”, as Salton has concluded, 
is probably not a positive step.  Salton claims that “religion tends by its own nature 
to be irrational, so the law – which on the contrary is, or should be, rational – will 
necessarily have problems in dealing with the dilemmas of the spirit.” 76  
                                                 
72 Genital Mutilation” (Model United Nations Far West (MUNFW) 50th Session Issues, available at: 
http://www.munfw.org/archive/50th/who2.htm (at 15 April 2005). 
73 See statements from Sheikh Ahmed Kutty and Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, above 16-17. 
74 “Circumcision is to cut off only the foreskin of the male sexual organ, and not to cut off more than 
that nor even a part of the private part, as practised in some primitive lands.”: Shaykh ‘Abdul-‘Aziz 
bin Abdullah bin Baz, Shaykh Mohammed bin Salih Al-‘Uthaimin, Shaykh “Abdullah bin ‘Abdur-
Rahman Al-Jibreen and the Permanent Committee and decisions of the Fiqh Council, Fatawa 
Islamiyah - Islamic Verdicts (Darussalam, Riyadh, 2002) 343, under the heading “The Shari’ah 
Definition of Circumcision”.  These three scholars are usually said to adhere to the “Wahabi” school 
of Islam, popular in Saudi Arabia and widely regarded as a more conservative strain of Islamic 
doctrine.  If even they, as Islamic conservatives, regard circumcision as being limited to males, it 
would seem to underline the point that female circumcision is not an Islamic tenet. 
75 See also Sheikh Mohammed Ali Al-Hanooti who has ruled that “Circumcision of women has 
nothing to do with Sunnah [the way of the prophet Mohammed], nor does it have any solid evidence 
in the Shari’ah [Islamic law].  I advise those Muslims who practise female circumcision to stop it”: 
http://www.islamonline.net/livefatwa/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=iOiazG (at 16 April 2005). 
76 See Salton, above n 1, 26.  It is acknowledged that Salton did not have cause to define the term 
“irrational”.  Correspondence with the author suggests that rather than wanting to convey the 
negative connotations inherent in the term “irrational”, Salton was perhaps trying to contrast the 
“non-spiritual” aspect of law with the inherently spiritual aspect of all religion.  However, even if 
Salton’s statement has been misconstrued, the point remains that in Islam as a religion, there is 
nothing “irrational” which clashes with the “rational” law, in the sense that law and religion are 
intimately connected in a way that they are not so connected in other religions.  For example, the 
sharia’a law, that includes the day-to-day laws which govern people’s lives in an Islamic state, are 
based squarely on spiritual laws.  Therefore, the claim that “the law…will necessarily have problems 
in dealing with the dilemmas of the spirit” is not applicable, theoretically at least, in Islam.  It is on 
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Most religious adherents, be they Muslim, Christian or followers of any other faith, 
do not regard their beliefs as “irrational”.  Given that Islam is the subject of Salton’s 
discourse, perhaps it is specifically Islam that he has in mind when he refers to 
irrationality.  To the approximately 1.3 billion people across the world (around 22 
percent of the world’s population) who claim to adhere to it, Islam is viewed as a 
highly rational system of human organisation, coming directly (as Muslims believe) 
from God.77  To describe their religion as “irrational” will probably not assist in 
finding a way of reconciling Islamic beliefs and practices with Western values and 
culture.   
 
A  Rational French laws 
 
Man-made laws to which Salton refers as being “rational” have been shown in the 
past to be somewhat less than deserving of that description.  When Napoleon 
introduced the Code of Napoleon in1804 he proclaimed that “Women ought to 
obey us. Nature has made women our slaves!”78  A noteworthy provision of the 
Code, Article 213 (which was not revised until 1938) stated that the husband owed 
protection to his wife, and the wife owed obedience to her husband.79  
Furthermore:80
 
Under this provision, a married woman, whose status in the code was similar to that of a 
child or a lunatic, could not change her residence, travel, obtain a passport, or choose a 
doctor without the approval of her husband. The husband controlled his wife's contacts and 
could oversee her correspondence. 
 
The gender inequalities in nineteenth-century French civil law were matched by 
inequalities in criminal law, which harshly punished women’s sexual transgressions.  
Penalties for a wife's adultery were severe, whereas a husband could only be 
                                                                                                                                               
i
f r
this basis that the “irrationality” comment, and the conflict between law and religion, must be 
addressed. 
77 The figure of 1.3 billion is taken from a survey of the number of adherents of each major religion 
of the world, available at: http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html (at 16 April 
2005).  The writer does not claim that this figure is exact, since the exact figure is not overly 
important to the point that is being made here.  Other figures suggested range from 0.7 billion to 1.2 
billion:  http://www.religioustolerance.org/isl_numb.htm  (at 16 April 2005).  
78 Mary Ann Glendon The Transformation of Fam ly Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1989) 89. 
79 Ann Elizabeth Mayer “Reform of Personal Status Laws in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or 
Mediterranean Laws?”, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) Occasional Paper 8, July 
1996, 5; available at: http://www.wluml.org/english/pubs/rtf/occpaper/OCP-08.rtf  (at 16 April 
2005). 
80 See Jacques Foyer, "French Law" in The Reform o  Family Law in Eu ope AG Chloros (ed) 
(Deventer, Kluwer, 1978) 79-80; Dorothy Stetson, Women's Rights in France (New York, 
Greenwood Press, 1987), 83-84. 
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punished for his adultery if he brought his mistress to the family home.81  Mayer 
writes:82
 
Legal steps to give French women their long-deferred equality were taken within the span of 
just one decade, the period 1965-75. Only in 1965 did a wife get the right to work without 
her husband's permission, and only in 1970 did husbands finally forfeit the rights that came 
with their status as head of the family (chef de famille). 
 
 Thus it would appear that man-made laws are not always “rational”, even though, as 
Salton points out, they ought to be, and even though their instigators might 
consider them rational at the time of their introduction.  It is submitted that the 
underlying reason which led to the enactment of the laws in the Code of Napoleon 
in 1804 was probably fear and misunderstanding: a fear of women becoming too 
strong and too powerful for men to control if given the same legal and political 
rights as men; a misunderstanding of the equality that ought to exist between men 
and women.  It is suggested that fear and misunderstanding seem to be driving 
developments in France, and elsewhere, in the present day, but these days the fear is 
no longer of the power that women might yield, rather, the fear now is of Muslims 
(even Muslim girls) and the power that they might yield if given full equality of 
rights such as the freedom of religious expression.  In short, the fear underlying the 
granting of women’s rights in nineteenth century France has been supplanted by the 
fear of granting religious freedom to minorities, especially the Muslim minority, in 
present day Western secular states such as France.  The whole issue is far more 
complicated than the French Government has been willing to admit, concentrating 
as it did on issues of equality between the sexes, when the real issue was the fear 
(justified or not) that ordinary French citizens feel at the growing power of Islamic 
“fundamentalism” in their country, and probably in Europe as a whole. 
 
IV  “AN INTOLERABLE SYMBOL OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN” 
 
Whether the growing fear of Islam in Europe is well-grounded or not should be the 
subject for debate.  To determine whether the fear is warranted, the only solution 
can be an honest, thorough inquiry into the bases for so-called religious beliefs and 
practices.  A thorough inquiry would reveal that the headscarf and the practice of 
FGM are not on the same side of the ledger.  Headscarves are worn because it is a 
requirement in Islamic law that women cover their bodies and dress modestly.  This 
is understood by Muslims to be better for them as individuals, for the sanctity of 
marriage and for society as a whole.  By comparison, FGM is forbidden in Islam as 
an extreme form (of the probably permitted but not obligatory practice) of female 
circumcision (the removal of the prepuce, not excision and infibulation).   
Headscarves are usually worn voluntarily by young women and adults.  FGM is 
usually carried out on babies or young girls who have no choice in the matter.  
Headscarves are usually placed on one’s head by one’s own physical actions.  FGM 
                                                 
81 Mayer, above n 79, 21. 
82 A summary of the evolution of women's status in French law can be found in Foyer, "French Law", 
above n 80, 75-109: also Mayer, above n 79, 5. 
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is usually carried out by a process of holding the baby/girl/woman down while the 
procedure is carried out.  
 
Following on from a process of honest inquiry there is also a need for education and 
discussion involving all groups in society – Muslims and non-Muslims alike – 
regarding the underlying reasons why adherents favour practices such as wearing a 
headscarf (or turban, or yarmulke or habit for that matter).  Muslims – as much as 
any group – need to be educated about the fact that FGM is forbidden in Islamic 
law.   
 
The problems that presently exist in integrating Muslims into Western societies 
such as France can only be exacerbated if governments ignore the underlying 
problem and instead try to clothe the issue simply in terms of Islam’s encroachment 
upon “secularity” and its alleged attack on “women’s rights”.  French feminists seem 
to have hijacked the headscarf debate by turning the issue into one of women’s 
rights, when the girls themselves are not demanding the “right” to take off the 
headscarf.  The non-Muslims’ apparent concern for headscarf-wearing schoolgirls 
seems rather hollow when the law banning headscarves was passed by, what Salton 
calls, a “devastating majority of men”, because “women make up only a fraction of 
the total number of French MPs”.83   
 
As for the future of the headscarf in France, it is interesting to note that some 
sectors of the French public were so upset over the wearing of headscarves in 
schools that they signed a petition, published in the French-language Elle magazine 
in December 2003, calling for the outright banning of the Islamic headscarf.  The 
sixty female signatories, that included celebrities, sociologists and philosophers, 
declared the headscarf to be an "intolerable symbol of discrimination against 
women" and called for a complete ban on “this visible symbol of the submission of 
women”.84  Perhaps the ban on wearing the headscarf in public schools is only the 
beginning. 
 
A       Perception and  reality 
 
When Ferushta Ludin, a school teacher in a state school in Stuttgart, Germany was 
banned by local educational authorities from teaching with a headscarf, she took her 
case to Germany’s constitutional court.  She argued that she should not be barred 
from teaching whilst wearing a hijab because the German constitution guaranteed 
her freedom of religious expression and unlimited access to public jobs.  The 
minister responsible for education in the state of Baden-Wuerttemburg, Annette 
                                                 
i
83 Salton, above n 1, 23. 
84 As the original petition was published in French, I have relied upon other media reports of its 
translation: including The Guard an, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/ 
0,11882,1101321,00.html (at 16 April 2005); Aljazeera.net http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/ 
exeres/47FF05A2-E892-4650-859A-608F640EBB1F.htm (at 16 April 2005).  According to the latter 
source, the petitioners apparently wrote that: “The Islamic veil sends us all - Muslims and non-
Muslims - back to a discrimination against women which is intolerable.” 
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Schaven, argued that the headscarf was political and "understood as a symbol of the 
exclusion of woman from civil and cultural society" (emphasis added).85    The 
problem here, as in France, is that the headscarf is understood to be a symbol of 
exclusion and inequality: but understood by whom and why?  The Muslim women 
who wear it do not understand it that way,86 thus it must be a reference to non-
Muslims.  But why should non-Muslims view the headscarf in such a negative light?  
If the women themselves want to wear it, why should others want to step in and 
protect them from their own personal wishes?   
 
After all, women around the world (in most countries) are free to wear revealing 
clothes that many Muslim women (and perhaps even non-Muslims) find 
inappropriate at times, perhaps being too revealing or unsuitable for a particular 
person in a given situation. The London-based Arabic daily newspaper, Al-Quds Al 
Arabi, made this point in relation to the French ban on headscarves, when it 
observed that, “It is illogical that French laws allow girls to wear short tight skirts, 
show their breasts, plunge into vice, and then prevent them from covering their 
heads…Covering one's head is illegal, but showing breasts, bottoms and legs, that is 
legal.”87  
 
The viewpoint expressed in Al-Quds Al-Arabi is probably representative of many 
Muslims, namely, that there is an apparent inconsistency in preventing girls from 
covering their heads based on a desire for modesty when there are neither social nor 
legal consequences for girls who choose not to cover other parts of their body.  As 
such, many headscarf-wearing Muslims feel as if they are being directly targeted and 
that Muslim women and girls are being unfairly forced to uncover.   
 
B    The real target? 
 
The incoherence of banning the headscarf in the secular state schools of France is 
further highlighted by the fact that many other religions were not overtly targeted, 
and exhibiting signs of one’s political affiliations did not seem to concern either the 
Stasi Commissioners or the general public.88  If adherence to the principle of laïcité 
was the underlying reason for the ban on headscarves, then ought not the French 
Government to have banned any signs of one’s religious affiliations, not just signs 
worn on the head or around the neck?  Logically, the ban should have specifically 
                                                 
85 Catherine Field, “Culture Clash Comes to a Head” New Zealand Herald 30 September 2003, 2.  
86 See above at 4-5, where it is argued that many women who voluntarily wear the headscarf enjoy 
wearing it and feel that it gives them protection and sexual equality. 
87 See report in “Bad Press for Headscarf Ban” BBC News (13 December 2003) available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3316605.stm (at 16 April 2005). 
88 It is interesting that “big crosses, headscarves and kippas” were specifically mentioned (Salton, 
above n 1, 4, n 12) but wearing T-shirts that display one’s membership of, for example, animal rights 
groups and therefore belief in animal welfare, was not seen as a concern. 
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included T-shirts, badges, stickers, even facial hair, if any such symbol might give 
away one’s religious beliefs and impinge on the principle of laïcité.89   
 
Perhaps the truth is that this ban was aimed squarely at Islam, that it was the 
culmination of at least two decades of increasing anger within French society at the 
conspicuousness of headscarves, especially in schools, and that this law was what the 
French public believed was needed to stop the increasing strength of a foreign and 
unwanted religious and political movement within their country.  By striking at 
schools, a sphere within state control, the French public were seemingly taking a 
stand against Islam, a stand that they could not (or at least not yet) take to the 
wider community, since forcing all Muslim women to remove their headscarves 
would (at present) not be politically or practically viable.90  It is suggested that the 
headscarf ban was powered by something more than an apparent need to protect 
girls’ rights, or the need to respect the principle of laïcité. 
 
V     DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS  
 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on 12 
April 2005 by a roll-call vote of 31 in favour, 16 against, and five abstentions 
regarding its concern over the defamation of religions, particularly Islam.91  The 
resolution, drafted by Pakistan on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, “noted with concern” that “defamation of religions is among the causes 
of social disharmony and leads to violations of human rights.”92  The resolution 
                                                 
89 Education Minister Luc Ferry suggested beards could also be banned from schools, because they 
have become associated with Islamic radicals, and Jean-Yves Souben, headmaster of the Garcia-Llorca 
high school, north of Paris said "Things in schools could become surreal, I have a beard, like half the 
male teachers in the French education system!”: “French Headscarf Ban Set to Misfire”, New 
Zealand Herald (3 February 2004) available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm? 
ObjectID=3547065  (at 16 April 2005).  The banning of beards may have been used as a humourous 
example of how difficult it is to ban all signs of religious affiliation, yet beards have been banned in 
Turkish educational institutions.  On 23 July 1998 the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Istanbul 
issued a circular stating that students with beards and students wearing the Islamic headscarf would 
be refused admission to lectures, courses and tutorials: see Press Release of the Chamber Judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights Leyla Şahin v Turkey Application No 44774/98, (29 June 
2004) available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/ 
2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSahinandTekin.htm  (at 3 May 2005).  
90 Although such a ban might be attempted in the future, as the Elle magazine petition showed that 
there is some support for banning the wearing of headscarves completely.  A ban on the wearing of 
face coverings has been introduced in Italy, after the lower and upper Houses of the Italian 
Parliament recently passed “anti-terrorism measures” including the imposition of a term of 
imprisonment of two years, or a 2000 euro fine, for anyone covering their faces in public.  This “anti-
terrorism” measure applies to women wearing the nikab or face-veil: see BBCNews “Italian anti-
terror law enacted” (30 July 2005) available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/4731711.stm (at 9 
August 2005). 
91 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (12 April 2005) Combating Defamation of 
Religions (E/CN.4/2005/L.1), [hereinafter referred to as “the UNCHR Resolution”] available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G05/119/82/PDF/G0511982.pdf?OpenElement (at 
16 April 2005).  
92 The UNCHR resolution, above n 91, preambular paragraph 14, p3. 
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noted with “deep concern” the recent trend of “statements attacking religions, Islam 
and Muslims in particular, especially in human rights forums”.93   
 
A   UNCHR  Resolution on Defamation of Religions 
 
To better illustrate some of the arguments put forward here, some of the key 
articles of the resolution are set out below: 94
 
The Commission on Human R ghts… i
r
r
                                                
… 
(1) Exp esses deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of 
intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in some 
regions of the world; 
 
(2) Strongly deplores physical attacks and assaults on businesses, cultural centres and places of 
worship of all religions as well as targeting of religious symbols95; 
 
(3) Notes with deep concern the intensification of the campaign of defamation of religions, and 
the ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of the tragic events 
of 11 September 2001; 
 
(4) Exp esses deep concern that Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights 
violations and terrorism; 
 
(5) Also expresses deep concern at programmes and agendas pursued by extremist organizations 
and groups aimed at the defamation of religions, in particular when supported by 
Governments; 
... 
(8) Stresses the need to effectively combat defamation of all religions, Islam and Muslims in 
particular especially in human rights forums. 
 
It is notable that half of the 16 states that voted against the adoption of the above 
articles were European countries. Their objections were summarized by the 
representative from the Netherlands, who spoke on behalf of the European Union 
and associated countries.  Their objection to the resolution seems to have been 
based upon its focus on Islam and Muslims.  The European countries wanted a 
“broader, more balanced text, based on the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
 
93 Ibid, preambular paragraph 15m p3. 
94 Ibid, extracts from the operative articles of the UNCHR resolution. 
95 It is unclear whether “religious symbols” includes, or could include, headscarves.  The French 
Government seems to have taken the view that headscarves are religious symbols, hence it could be 
argued that the ban on wearing them is the type of action that the resolution is seeking to prohibit.    
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of expression.”96  France was one of the countries that voted against the adoption of 
the above resolution.97    
 
It would be too simplistic to suggest that the voting occurred along Muslim versus 
non-Muslim lines.  The states that voted in favour of the resolution included mainly 
those in which Islam is the dominant religion, but there were also many exceptions, 
such as Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Equador, Mexico, Paraguay, the 
Russian Federation, South Africa and Sri Lanka.98  On the other hand, all of the 
countries that voted against the UNCHR’s Resolution mentioned that it ought not 
to have singled out Muslims and Islam for special protection.  
 
It is suggested this resolution, its text and its voting record, illustrate two points.  
First, that many states are acutely aware of the fact that Islam is regularly defamed 
and that this practice has increased since 11 September 2001.  Article 4 states that 
Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and 
terrorism.  That is quite evident from the frequent connection that is made between 
the headscarf and women’s oppression, a connection that was used in France to help 
enact the headscarf ban.  It is also evident in the connection that is often made 
between Islam and practices that clearly do violate human rights, such as FGM, as 
discussed above.  The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has shown 
that these are not isolated cases of defaming Islam; rather, they are indicative of a 
systemic problem that exists in the media, on the Internet and is even propagated by 
some governments. 
 
 The second key point that can be made regarding the resolution is that it indicates 
the appearance of a sort of “faultline” which has developed between Western, mainly 
“secular” states such as the European Union, Canada, the United States (if it can be 
called a “secular state”) and Australia, and the rest.  The former group of states 
(loosely called “the West”) have all experienced a relatively recent influx of 
immigrants, among whom are many highly visible Muslim immigrants whose 
integration is often seen as problematic by the existing populations.  The issue of 
the headscarf has heightened the feeling that these minority Muslim groups are not 
adequately integrating into society.  The experiences of these countries have shaped 
the way their governments and their publics view the right of freedom of religion, 
and the ways in which they are willing to let that right be exercised. By comparison, 
                                                 
96 Ian de Jong, (Netherlands), United Nations Press Release (12 April 2005) “Commission Adopts 
Resolutions on Combating Defamation of Religions and on Right to Development” available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/F5FAD16BD4CDAFE5C1256FE1006B4504?
opendocument  (at 16 April 2005). 
97 Ibid.  The 16 states that voted against the UNCHR resolution were: Australia, Canada, Dominican 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungry, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Romania, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
98 Ibid.  The 31 states that voted in favour were: Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe.  The five abstentions were from 
Armenia, Honduras, India, Peru and Republic of Korea.  Gabon was absent. 
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“the rest” of the countries, such as the states in South America, Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia that voted in favour of the resolution, have not experienced these 
difficulties, either because they are mainly Muslim (or have significant Muslim 
populations) already and thus the integration of immigrant Muslim minorities is not 
an issue, or because they understand the concept of “freedom of religion” 
differently.  Perhaps they do not feel that their fundamental values, such as 
secularity, are being threatened by the religious minorities who are living amongst 
them.   
 
VI  A CLASH OF “ISLAMIC ORIENTATIONS” RATHER THAN “CIVILIZATIONS” 
 
It is suggested that there is less a “clash of civilizations” operating here, than a clash 
of responses to the challenge of Islam:  the anti-Islam states versus the pro-Islam 
and the neutral-Islam states.99  The “pro-Islam” and “neutral-Islam” states cannot be 
categorised as belonging to one single civilization, but they do have in common 
either sympathy for or empathy with the defamation of Muslims and Islam.  The 
argument here is that Islam has become a sort of political point of reference with 
each country assuming a different position on the compass depending on its 
reaction to and tolerance for Islam (or to be more precise, Islam as it is perceived in 
each particular state).  
 
Based on the reactions of states to the United Nations’ Commission on Human 
Rights’ Resolution on Combating Defamation of Religions, an alternative 
framework is put forward here which may enhance our understanding of what we 
can expect in the future. The scenario suggested here is that what we are witnessing 
is a clash - not exactly between civilizations as Huntington has suggested - but 
between states who are aligned according to their “Islamic orientation”.  Lined up 
on one side are states from Africa (Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, 
Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, South Africa Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe), 
South and Central America (Argentina, Brazil Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Paraguay) and the Middle East and Asia (China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sri 
Lanka).100  These states all arguably share a “pro-Islam” or “neutral-Islam” 
orientation.101   
 
                                                 
99 This is rather simplistic and it does not explain why all of the 16 states voted against the UNCHR 
resolution, and why the 31 states voted for it.  Instead of “anti-Islam”, one might read this as 
meaning, “those that are struggling with the presence of Islam inside their country and have taken 
steps to minimize its influence”.  That is the essence of the idea that is trying to be conveyed here.  
100 Only the states that voted on the UNCHR resolution on the defamation of religions are listed 
here. 
101 This is necessarily a rather loose generalisation.  One could take issue with many of these states 
and point to instances in which they have not acted as “pro-Islam” or “neutral-Islam” states.  The 
most glaring example would probably be the Russian Federation, given its history of involvement in 
Afghanistan and, more recently, Chechnya.  However, the Russian Federation did vote in favour of 
the UNCHR resolution, thus allowing it to be placed in this grouping for the purposes of the 
current argument. 
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On the other side of the compass are the European Union and associated states 
(Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Romania), 
predominantly Christian countries aligned with the European Union states 
(Australia,102 Canada,103 the Dominican Republic,104 Guatemala,105 the United 
Kingdom,106 Ukraine107 and the United States108) as well as Japan.109
 
These (loosely called) “anti-Islam” states cannot be said to belong to one 
“civilization” - they cannot be grouped together by their similarity of religion, 
geographical area or historical ties - thus presenting a problem for any “clash of 
civilizations” type of methodology.  However, their responses to the Resolution on 
the Defamation of Religions is evidence that they do share some form of negative 
feeling towards Islam and that they object to affording Islam and Muslims specific 
protection. 
 
In support of this proposition, it is noted that many states have shown themselves 
as being so anti-Islam that they are willing to vote against an entire resolution, 
which for the most part is quite general in its condemnation of the defamation of all 
religions, because they object to Islam being singled out in some places for special 
attention.110  This distinction between states on the basis of their “Islam orientation” 
is underlined by the fact that some states that voted in favour of the resolution did 
so even though they would have preferred other religions to have been specifically 
mentioned.  China, for example, said that it voted for the resolution because it was 
against the defamation of any religion, including Islam.  Cuba likewise said that “no 
religion should be defamed but Islam requires special treatment” and Costa Rica 
                                                 
102 Australia is 76.4% Christian, although this is made up of different denominations: see CIA, The 
World Factbook (10 February 2005) available at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/dr.html  (at 16 April 2005). 
103 Canada is at least 82% Christian since its population is 46% Roman Catholic and 36% Protestant, 
but the 18% “other” does not specify whether other Christian groups are also included in the latter 
figure: Ibid 59.  
104 The Dominican Republic is 95% Roman Catholic: Ibid 59. 
105 Guatemala is predominantly Roman Catholic and Protestant, and indigenous Mayan beliefs are 
also practised. 
106 The United Kingdom is predominantly Christian (there are estimated to be 40 million Anglicans 
and Roman Catholics), although interestingly Muslims (at 1.5 million) outnumber some Christian 
denominations (Presbyterians at 800,000) and are the second largest religious group, behind the 
Christians: Ibid, above n 59. 
107 The Ukraine is predominantly Christian orthodox: Ibid 59. 
108 The United States is predominantly Christian with a total of 78% (Protestant 52%, Roman 
Catholic 24% and Mormon 2%), Ibid 59. 
109 Japan is 84% Shinto and Buddhist:  Ibid 59. 
110 Of the 18 operative articles in the UNCHR resolution, only 4 articles specifically refer to Muslims 
or Islam or both.  The other articles use general phrases such as “racism”, “xenophobia” and 
“defamation of religions”, which obviously refer to all religions.  Despite that, of the 16 states that 
voted against the resolution, those that made a comment explaining their vote all mentioned their 
opposition to Muslims and/or Islam being singled out for attention, and they would have preferred a 
resolution that mentioned all religions, not just Islam.  Honduras’ representative specifically 
mentioned Christianity and Judaism as two religions which ought to have been specifically 
mentioned, along with Islam. 
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voted for it even though it expressed the hope that next year it would “have a more 
universal language.”111
 
Although this writer does not entirely agree with Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” analysis, he does seem to have hit upon something when he states that, 
“The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism.  It is 
Islam…The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense.  
It is the West…”112
 
It is suggested that what we have seen recently regarding the UNCHR’s Resolution 
on the Defamation of Religions and the earlier ban on the headscarf in France is 
evidence of a trend which sees states aligning themselves according to their 
approach to the challenges posed in their individual counties by Islam, what I have 
referred to above as their “Islamic orientation”.   
 
The argument that many South American states are placing themselves in the “pro-
Islam” or “neutral-Islam” camp found strong support recently with the holding of 
the inaugural Summit of South American-Arab Countries, in Brasilia, from 10-11 
May 2005. 113 The Summit concluded with the adoption of the Declaration of 
Brasilia, which included several provisions aimed at supporting Arabs, particularly 
Palestinians, and which is generally at odds with the United States’ policy.114  This 
development of increased co-operation between the states of South America and the 
Middle East provides support for the argument that has been advanced here, that 
nations are aligning themselves increasingly according to their “Islamic orientation”. 
 
VII WHERE WILL THE HEADSCARF BATTLE BE FOUGHT NEXT? 
 
The question of whether Muslim girls and women should be allowed to wear 
headscarves in educational institutions, and elsewhere, may have only just begun.  
The issue has already arisen in many countries, besides France.  Germany, the 
                                                 
111 See UNCHR Press Release 12 April 2005, available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/ 
huricane.nsf/view01/F5FAD16BD4CDAFE5C1256FE1006B4504?opendocument  (at 16 April 
2005).  
112 Samuel P Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remak ng of Wo d Order, above n 20, 
217-218.  The writer does not agree with the words that are left out of this quote regarding the claim 
that both the West and Islam are convinced of their superiority.  This quote is used here to illustrate 
the importance of Islam as a political polemic. 
i rl
113 See the official website of the Summit of South American–Arab Countries available at: 
http://www2.mre.gov.br/aspa/en_home.htm  (at 16 May 2005). 
114 The Brasilia Declaration condemns the Israeli occupation of Palestine and calls for the withdrawal 
of Israel to its pre-1967 borders.  It also denounces the United States’ economic sanctions against 
Syria and although it denounces terrorism, it also asserts the rights of peoples to resist foreign 
occupation in accordance with the principles of international legality and in compliance with 
international humanitarian law:  see Aljazeera.net “Brazil summit policies at odds with US” (11 May 
2005) available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8362939C-770A-4A62-95FB-
416DA1B4AE7C.htm   (at 16 May 2005). 
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United States,115 Canada, Turkey,116 Belgium, Denmark,117 and Italy118 have each 
experienced their own headscarf controversies and this trend looks set to 
continue.119   
 
The difficulty of banning the Islamic headscarf is proving problematic for other 
religions, such as Judaism, Catholicism and Sikhism, which also have religious 
requirements for covering the head.  Catholic nuns in Germany have voiced their 
strong opposition to removing their habits in classrooms if the proposed bans on 
headscarves in some states are implemented.  Some German nuns feel that their 
habits cannot be compared to the “oppressive” headscarf of the Muslims and claim 
that the crucifix cannot even be mentioned in the “same breath as the headscarf”.120
 
It is predicted that the battle over the headscarf will remain a hot issue around the 
world, as each government turns its attention to the issue and finds its own way of 
dealing with it.  The headscarf debate has recently spread from the classroom and 
workplace to the sports field.  An American basketball player was allegedly 
prevented from playing for her college team after she converted to Islam and 
insisted on wearing long-sleeved shirts, pants and a hijab.121  The battle over the 
headscarf in Europe, far from being dampened down by legislative bans, looks set to 
expand as the issue heads to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.122   
                                                 
115 An 11-year-old American schoolgirl was suspended for five days in 2003 for refusing to remove 
her hijab: see Aljazeera, Shaista Aziz “US Schoolgirl in hijab victory” available at: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9A905A11-1711-4876-A45F-AA83FB0E1E2D.htm (at 16 
May 2005). 
116 Two Turkish sisters were arrested and held in custody in 2003 for attending demonstrations 
demanding the right to wear the hijab. Turkish law bans the hijab in universities, higher educational 
establishments and Islamic colleges: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/A30164A1-0E41-4C43-
B452-5F648D537680.htm  (at 16 April 2005).   
117 Denmark’s Supreme Court has ruled that a supermarket was entitled to fire a Muslim woman who 
wore her hijab to work.  The woman had signed a contract which banned headgear in front of 
customers: http://www.prohijab.net/english/denmark-hijab-news.htm  (at 16 April 2005). 
118 An Italian woman has been fined twice for wearing the all-enveloping veil, sometimes called the 
burqa, in her hometown in the province of Como.  She was ticketed under a 1931 law, imposed under 
the fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, which prohibits citizens from “masking themselves in public”: 
http://www.prohijab.net/english/italy-hijab-news.htm  (at 16 April 2005). 
119 For country-by-country updates of hijab issues, see the Assembly for the Protection of Hijab 
website: http://www.prohijab.net/english/hijabban-news.htm.  
120 See Kate Connolly, “Nuns defend habits in row over Islam scarf ban” Telegraph (16 January 2004) 
available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;sessionid= PFP1OKLD14OYP 
QFIQMGSM54AVCBQWJVC?xml=/news/2004/01/16/wnun16.xml&secureRefresh=true&_requ
estid=38106   (at 26 April 2005). 
121 Andrea Armstrong claims that she was forced to quit her team after insisting on wearing the 
Islamic clothing, as her coach told her that the clothing would make her teammates feel 
uncomfortable and that Islam oppresses women: http://www.prohijab.net/english/USA-hijab-
news.htm  (at 16 April 2005).  
122 On 21 February 2005, a Written Declaration Calling for the Right of Religious Dress in France 
and Throughout the European Union was launched at the European Parliament in Strasbourg 
(0005/2005).  Pro-hijab groups, such as the Assembly for the Protection of the Hijab, supported by 
other religious groups whose adherents wear headgear, such as Sikhs, are attempting to have the 
European Parliament adopt their declaration, which would protect the right to wear religious 
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Countries which have a significant or majority Muslim population are not immune 
from the issue.  Nigeria, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and even Saudi Arabia, have experienced how 
difficult it is to ban the wearing of the headscarf in schools, universities and in the 
workplace.  The fact that many “Muslim” countries have tried to restrict the wearing 
of the headscarf (or restrictions on boys’ Islamic headwear) supports the argument 
being advanced here that there is not really a clash of civilizations, rather a clash of 
approaches or orientations towards Islam.  If the clash of civilizations hypothesis 
were true, then all Muslim countries would be expected to have taken the same 
approach to the wearing of the headscarf, namely, they would unanimously support 
the wearing of it.  That has not been the case.123
 
A  New Zealand and the headscarf debate 
 
New Zealand has already had a taste of things to come with the recent case in 
Auckland concerning the Afghan women who requested that they wear the burqa in 
court whilst giving evidence.124  In the sphere of education, New Zealand schools – 
like their French counterparts – have had to address whether students should be 
allowed to wear items that are outside the school dress code on the basis of 
students’ religious beliefs.   
 
B  Islamic d ess in New Zealand schools r
                                                                                                                                              
 
In 1994 the New Zealand Human Rights Commission (HRC) had to determine 
whether a school’s requirement that a Muslim student wear shorts and socks rather 
than trousers amounted to discrimination.125  The student, a 4th form boy, 
maintained that, because of his religious beliefs, he felt compelled to wear clothes 
that covered all of his legs in loose-fitting clothing.  The HRC reviewed the school’s 
uniform code, which the school strictly enforced because it claimed that: “in a 
school with such a diversity of race, culture and social economic background the 
 
headwear in Europe.  To become a resolution debated in the European Parliament, at least half of the 
Members of the European Parliament will have to support the Written Declaration within 3 months, 
that is, by 21 May 2005.  As of 12 May, only 70 of the required 367 signatories had signed up: see 
http://www.prohijab.net/english/main.htm  (at 16 May 2005).  An English version of the Written 
Declaration is available at http://www.prohijab.net/english/written-declaration/EN.doc  (at 16 May 
2005). 
123 In Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch reported that many university students were expelled for 
wearing Islamic clothing, including the headscarf, in 1997 and 1998: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/uzbek-04.htm  (at 16 April 2005).   
124 Police v Abdul Zahoor Razamjoo Auckland District Court (CRN 30044039397-8), 17 January 
2005. 
See Griffiths, D “There’s no Art to Find the Mind’s Construction in the Face: Some Thoughts on 
the Burqa Case in New Zealand” NZPGLeJ (2005/1) UPD2. 
125 C149/94 Human Rights Commission, 17 August 1994, available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/ 
index.php?p=13684&id=13957&wd0=marlborough&wd1=girls&wd2=college&format (at 2 May 
2005). 
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uniform symbolises that despite the differences ... when the students come together 
they do so as equals."126 The HRC was required to weigh this against the provision 
that prohibits “indirect discrimination” in section 65 of the Human Rights Act 
1993.127   
 
The HRC found that requiring the Muslim boy to wear shorts and socks indirectly 
discriminated against him on the grounds of his religious beliefs and that granting 
him a dispensation to wear trousers (which 6th form boys wore) would not 
undermine the objectives of the uniform code.  It also noted that some Somali girls 
had been allowed to wear headscarves in the past and that a nearby primary and 
intermediate school had allowed the complainant’s sisters to also wear headscarves.  
The school resolved the matter by then granting the complainant a dispensation to 
wear trousers, agreeing to allow other male Muslim students to seek dispensation 
and amending the uniform code to allow dispensation for uniform requirements in 
special circumstances for religious or medical reasons.  The fact that the matter had 
to come before the HRC in order to find resolution says something about the 
resistance that some New Zealand schools have to allowing their students to wear 
clothing that aligns with their religious beliefs.  The finding of the HRC that the 
school had indirectly discriminated against the boy says even more about the way 
that New Zealand legislation protects religious freedom, especially when contrasted 
with many other countries, particularly those of the European Union, discussed 
above.  
 
C  Cultural versus religious symbols 
 
In 2004, the issue of wearing spiritual symbols arose at Marlborough Girls College, 
which had a uniform policy that permitted the wearing of visible greenstone 
pendants or bone carvings, considered as Maori “taonga” (treasures), but required 
Christians and those practising other religions to keep their pendants on a long 
chain so that they would not be visible.128  A student, Megan Church, was told that 
she could not visibly display her crystal amethyst pendant, which she asserted she 
had worn since she was 10 years old due to the stone’s “calming effect”.  A HRC 
mediator was asked to assist in resolving the dispute.  The HRC Disputes 
Resolution Manager observed that: “Schools are increasingly finding themselves in 
the position of needing to accommodate a diverse range of cultures. While this 
                                                 
126 See C149/94 HRC. 
127 Section 65 reads: “Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in 
contravention of any provision of this Part of this Act has the effect of treating a person or group of 
persons differently on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a situation where such 
treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part of this Act other than this section, that 
conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be unlawful under that provision unless the person 
whose conduct or practice is in  issue, or who imposes the condition or requirement, establishes good 
reason for it.”: Human Rights Act 1993, section 65. 
128 See New Zealand Herald, “Dress code dispute goes to mediation” (10 March 2004) available at: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectID=3553734  (at 2 May 2005). 
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diversity is positive, allowing for it in uniform policy can be complex.”129  The 
matter was resolved privately between the parties.  The student no longer attends 
Marlborough Girls High.  The dress-code at the school remains essentially the same: 
the display of “taonga” which is displayed for “cultural reasons” is permitted but 
“religious or spiritual items may be tucked out of sight.”130   
 
This school’s approach to the outward display of cultural, religious and spiritual 
symbols is interesting.  It is difficult to see why cultural symbols are permitted to be 
visibly displayed on the students but religious and spiritual symbols are not.  This 
distinction bears more than a passing resemblance to the French ban on ostentatious 
religious symbols in public schools, revealing an apparent desire in a New Zealand 
secondary school to prevent students from visibly disclosing their religious beliefs.  
It is argued that this approach may amount to indirect discrimination, a violation of 
section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (“HRA”) and perhaps also section 15 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”).  It might be argued that 
the limitation on the wearing of religious symbols is a justifiable limitation, in terms 
of section five of the NZBORA, but the school may find it difficult to explain why 
it is justifiable for cultural symbols to be displayed whilst spiritual and religious 
symbols must be kept hidden.   
 
The New Zealand HRC, in a draft report that is yet to be released, notes that 
although primary school education in New Zealand is required by law to be secular, 
there is no equivalent requirement for secondary education.  As such, it may prove 
difficult to justify the restrictions on religious symbols in Marlborough Girls’ 
College’s dress-code on the grounds of secularity.  The difficulty of banning the 
display of religious symbols has been expressly noted by the Human Rights 
Commission in its draft report.131
 
Despite the examples discussed above, the wearing of Islamic headscarves in schools 
has, to date, not been perceived as much of a problem here.  There has been one 
complaint to the HRC regarding a school which did not permit a girl to wear the 
Islamic headscarf or to lengthen her skirt.  That complaint was apparently resolved 
by a Ministry of Education facilitator.132 However, there is a small but conspicuous 
presence of headscarf-wearing schoolgirls in New Zealand at both primary and 
                                                 
129 Mervan Singham, Disputes Resolution Manager, HRC, “Statement on the Marlborough Girls’ 
College dress code complaint” (24 March 2004) available at: http://www.hrc.co.nz/ 
index.php?p=13796&id=44867  (at 2 May 2005).   
130 The 2005 Prospectus of Malborough Girls’ College notes: “Cultural items, such as taonga, where 
display is intrinsic to the culture and/or the item may with the approval of the Principal, be worn 
openly. Religious or spiritual items may be tucked out of sight.”  This extract was kindly provided to 
the writer by Carolyne Jurriaans, Communications Officer at the Human Rights Commission. 
131 See HRC draft report, “Muslim women, dress codes and human rights: an introduction to the 
issues” at p13:  “A blanket ban on religious symbols or dress may also impact disproportionately on 
students who adhere to certain faiths thereby constituting indirect discrimination under section 65 of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, unless there is good reason for it. ‘Good reason’ could be to address 
health and safety concerns or where the practice disrupts other students’ rights.”  
132 See HRC draft report, above n 131 at p14, n72. 
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secondary schools. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are mainly Somali, Fijian-
Indian and Iraqi. Most schools resolve the issue by changing their dress-code to 
allow Muslim students to wear clothing that they feel comfortable with, such as a 
headscarf for girls, a longer skirt, or trousers.133  Some schools stipulate that if 
headscarves are going to be worn, then they must be black or white colour only,134 
or the school’s colours.135  In New Zealand, parents, teachers and fellow students do 
not yet seem to have much of a problem in accepting a few girls covering their 
heads.  But perhaps this may change in the future, since it also has to be 
acknowledged that New Zealand’s Muslim immigrant influx has occurred relatively 
recently, when compared to European countries, such as France.   
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
 
This article has addressed two practices which are widely recognised as being 
associated with Islam: the wearing of the headscarf and female circumcision.  It has 
sought to determine whether these practices are truly Islamic or whether their 
connection with Islam has been misinterpreted.  By virtue of the analysis regarding 
these two particular practices, this article has attempted to comment on the wider 
question of whether Islam and human rights (in the Western sense) are mutually 
incompatible.  It is suggested that several conclusions may be reached from the 
foregoing.   
 
First, the wearing of a headscarf by Muslim girls and women is considered by those 
who wear it to be a religious obligation based on notions of modesty and piety.  It is 
not perceived by its wearers as a symbol of oppression or an acknowledgement of 
inequality.  Wearing a head-covering is a manifestation of one’s religious beliefs - a 
human right that has been recognized and protected by both international 
institutions, such as the United Nations,136 and arguably individual states, such as 
New Zealand.137
                                                 
133 The HRC refers to Wellington East Girls’ College and Mt Roskill Grammar School as two schools 
which have addressed the issue by amending their dress-code:  see HRC draft report, above n 131 at 
14. 
134 This is anecdotal evidence based on the current practice of two Hamilton primary schools. 
135 See HRC draft report, above n 131 at p14 referring to the dress-code at Wellington East Girls’ 
College.  
136 For example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the observance and 
practice of religion or belief may include the wearing of distinctive clothing or head-coverings. See 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art 18), CCPR/C/12/Rev.1/Add.4 as cited in the draft report of 
the New Zealand Human Rights Commission “Muslim Women, Dress Codes and Human Rights: 
An introduction to the issues”, May 2005 p8, fn 35. 
137Section 15 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ) provides that: “Every person has the right to 
manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either 
individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private”.  Although no specific 
reference is made to head-coverings in this section, the Ministry of Justice considers that the term 
“observance” includes the “wearing of distinctive clothing”:  see Ministry of Justice, The Guidelines 
on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights and Freedoms in the Bill of 
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Second, the wearing of the headscarf is to be contrasted with the practice of female 
circumcision, which is a pre-Islamic practice that is permitted in Islam but in a very 
limited form, in special circumstances if particular conditions are met.  Although 
limited female circumcision is probably permitted in Islam (there are differences of 
opinion between scholars), there is nevertheless widespread agreement that it is 
definitely not a religious obligation.  However, FGM is forbidden in Islam because 
it is an extreme practice and is not sanctioned by the sources of Islamic law.  Not 
only is it forbidden in Islam but it is also the subject of numerous international and 
domestic laws prohibiting its practice.138 The contrast between the wearing of a 
headscarf and the practice of FGM could not be more distinct - one is obligatory in 
Islam and protected by international and domestic laws, the other is forbidden in 
Islam and prohibited in international and domestic laws. 
 
Third, Islam and human rights (particularly rights pertaining to women) are entirely 
compatible.  It is suggested that neither the wearing of headscarves nor the practice 
of female circumcision (in the limited form in which it is permitted) pose a threat to 
the protection of human rights.  As for the former, the wearing of a headscarf is a 
manifestation of one’s religious beliefs – a right guaranteed by states such as New 
Zealand.  As such it cannot logically be seen as both an exercise of religious freedom 
and as a practice that is incompatible with human rights. As for the latter, female 
circumcision is only permitted if it is limited to the removal of the prepuce, if it is 
medically necessary, and if it is undertaken by medical professionals using medical 
techniques and equipment.  These conditions are often completely ignored by those 
who insist on continuing the practice of female genital cutting. When understood in 
these terms, it is quite compatible with New Zealand laws regarding female genital 
mutilation.139  Without doubt, FGM is not a tenet of Islam because it is forbidden in 
Islam.  Since the practice of female genital mutilation is not sanctioned by Islam, it 
cannot logically be used as an example of Islam’s threat to human rights. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Rights Act for the Public Sector, available at: http://www.justice.govt.nz/ pubs/reports/2004/bill-of-
rights-guidelines/index.html  (at 16 April 2005). 
138 Female genital mutilation is a crime in New Zealand by virtue of section 204A of the Crimes Act 
1961. 
139 The definition of FGM in section 204A(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) is very wide: “’Female 
genital mutilation’ means the excision, infibulation, or mutilation of the whole or part of the labia 
majora, labia minora, or clitoris of any person”.  It is arguable as to whether this definition includes 
Islamic female circumcision, which is limited to the removal of the prepuce, or hood, of the clitoris, 
not the mutilation of the clitoris itself.  However, if the definition does include the limited form of 
female circumcision permitted in Islam (removal of the prepuce only), the procedure could still be 
performed under section 204A(3), which permits medical or surgical procedures for the sake of the 
person’s physical or mental health.  This is entirely consistent with the Islamic conditions which are 
attached to the procedure, as outlined above at 12-13.  Islamic scholars also take the view that the 
procedure must be medically necessary.  However, what is clear is that the procedure could not be 
conducted on religious grounds alone, by virtue of section 204A(4), which provides that cultural and 
religious reasons are not to be taken into account in any decisions taken to perform such procedures. 
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This article has also addressed the way in which the issue of the Islamic headscarf 
has been addressed in French schools and, to a more limited extent, in New Zealand 
schools.  It is suggested that although the issue of wearing the headscarf in New 
Zealand schools has not been perceived as much of a concern, eventually the issue is 
bound to surface here, perhaps when enough of the community feel fearful or 
mistrustful of the Muslims in their midst.  At that point, as in France, the headscarf 
will probably become a focus of that fear and mistrust.  Inevitably, sections 13 and 
15 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, will then come under closer 
scrutiny,140 along with a number of other provisions which seek to protect New 
Zealanders who are exercising their freedom of religion.141  Section 15 of the Bill of 
Rights Act not only guarantees the right to freedom of religion for New Zealanders, 
but is also protects the manifestation of one’s religion, which the New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice interprets as including the wearing of distinctive clothing.142  If 
the issue of the headscarf does arise here, it is difficult to say for certain how the 
matter would be resolved: whether the rights of the girls to wear them would be 
upheld, or whether the school’s rights to restrict the wearing of religious symbols 
would prevail.  The decisions of the HRC, referred to above, are not binding but 
they are a useful insight into what type of approach might be taken here.  However, 
there are clearly some schools which do not see any place for visible religious 
symbols.143  The French experience has shown that many people do not regard the 
Islamic headscarf as a dress-code issue, but as a religious symbol that has no place in 
the secular state education system. 
 
One would hope that if and when the headscarf battle arrives here New Zealand 
might be better prepared for it, having observed the way that other states have 
handled (and mishandled) the issue.  At least New Zealand has some robust 
statutory provisions that will possibly clarify the issue without the need for any 
further intervention by either Parliament or the courts.  Perhaps New Zealand girls 
who want to wear a piece of material over their hair will not be perceived as such an 
“aggressive” threat as are their sisters overseas.144   
 
                                                 
140 See Griffiths’ article for a discussion of how these issues have been framed to date. 
141 In an as yet unpublished report, the HRC have identified a number of provisions which are 
relevant to the headscarf issue.  As well as sections 13 and 15, the HRC considers that sections 14, 19 
and 20 of the NZBORA may also be relevant, together with sections 21(1)(c) and 21(1)(d) of the 
Human Rights Act 1993. 
142 See the Ministry of Justice’ guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, available at: 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/bill-of-rights-guidelines/index.html  (at 16 April 
2005).  
143 That is, Marlborough Girls’ College, which is discussed above.  This school’s dress-code allows 
cultural symbols to be displayed but not religious or spiritual symbols. 
144 French President Jacque Chirac stated that there was “something aggressive” about the headscarf: 
supra n 8. 
 33
